This paper studies dynamic mechanism design in a quasilinear Markovian environment and analyze a direct mechanism model of a principal-agent framework in which the agent is allowed to exit at any period. We consider that the agent's private information, referred to as state, evolves over time. The agent makes decisions of whether to stop or continue and what to report at each period. The principal, on the other hand, chooses decision rules consisting of an allocation rule and a set of payment rules to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff. In order to influence the agent's stopping decision, one of the terminal payment rules is posted-price, i.e., it depends only on the realized stopping time of the agent. We define the incentive compatibility in this dynamic environment in terms of Bellman equations, which is then simplified by establishing a one-shot deviation principle.
Introduction
Mechanism design theory provides a theoretical foundation for designing games that can induce desired outcomes. The players of the game have private information that is not publicly observable. Hence, the mechanism designer's collective decisions have to rely on the players to reveal their private information. This information asymmetry and the corresponding incentive compatibility are important features of mechanism design problems. The revelation principle allows the mechanism designer to focus on a class of incentive-compatible direct mechanisms to replicate equilibrium outcomes of indirect mechanisms. In the celebrated work by Vickery in 1961 Vickrey [1961] , it has been shown that the seller receives the same expected revenue independent of the mechanism within a large class of auctions. Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism is an example of truthful mechanism to achieve a social-optimal solution. We aim to investigate mechanism design problems in a dynamic environment, in which a player, a.k.a., the agent, sends a sequence of messages based on the gathered information to the designer. The designer, a.k.a., the principal, chooses a dynamic value structure to maximize the profit based on the messages. We are particularly interested in scenarios when the agent makes multiple payoff-relevant decisions over multiple periods. Our task in this paper is to settle the design regimes to elicit the agent to release his private information under the dynamic environment and to optimally respond to such behavior.
Many real-world problems are fundamentally dynamic in nature. Research of dynamic mechanism design has studied many applications in optimal auctions (e.g., Eső and Szentes [2007] , Lin et al. [2010] ), screening (e.g., Akan et al. [2015] , Courty and Hao [2000] , Deb and Said [2015] ), optimal taxation (e.g., Findeisen and Sachs [2016] , Makris and Pavan [2015] ), contract design (e.g., Williams [2011] , Zhang [2009] ), matching market (e.g., Akbarpour et al. [2014] , Anderson and Smith [2010] ), to name a few. In dynamic mechanism problems, there are mechanisms without private information. For example, in airline revenue management problems, an airline makes decisions about seats pricing on a flight by taking into account the time-varying inventory and the time-evolution of the customer base. In this paper, however, we consider an information-asymmetric dynamic environment in which the agent privately possesses information that evolves over time. The time evolution of the private information may be caused by external factors, the past observations, as well as the decisions from the principal, as when the agent employs learning-by-doing regimes. For example, in repeated sponsored search auctions, the advertisers privately learn about the profitability of clicks on their ads based on evaluations of past ads as well as observations from market analysis.
Optimal stopping theory studies the timing decisions under conditions of uncertainty and has been successfully adopted in applications of economics, finance, and engineering. Examples include gambling problems (e.g., Dubins and Sudderth [1977] , He et al. [2019] ), option tradings (e.g., Ano [2009] , Lamberton et al. [2009] , Lundgren and Silvestrov [2010] ), and quick detection problems (e.g., Li et al. [2014] , Tartakovsky and Veeravalli [2008] ). This paper studies a class of general dynamic mechanism design models, in which the agent has the right to stop the mechanism at any period based on his observations by current period and the anticipations of the entire future. The agent forms a stopping rule before the mechanism starts and is allowed to realize the stopping time in any period before mechanism terminates naturally upon reaching the final period. We consider a finite-horizon setting of a Markovian environment, in which the agent can observe the private information, referred to as state, that arrives at the beginning of each period. The dynamic information structure is governed by a stochastic process that is characterized by the principal's decision rules and the transition kernels of the state's dynamics. After observing his state at each period, the agent chooses a strategy to report his state to the principal and decides whether to stop immediately or to continue. Conditioning on the reported information (including the stopping decision), the principal provides an allocation to the agent and induces a payment. The principal aims to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff by choosing feasible decision rules including a set of allocation rules and a set of payment rules. The principal provides three payment rules including an intermediate payment that specifies a payment based on the report when the agent decides to continue and two terminal payment rules, one of which is state-dependent. The other terminal payment is posted-price in the sense that this payment rule depends only on the realized stopping time, which enables the principal to influence the agent's stopping decision without taking into account the agent's reporting strategy. This state-independent terminal payment rule could be the early termination fee to disincentivize the agent from early stopping (when the preferences of the principal and the agent are not aligned); or it could be a reward to elicit the agent to stop at certain periods before the final period to fulfill the principal's own interests (when the preferences of the principal and the agent are aligned or partially-aligned). Under some monotone conditions, the optimal stopping rule can be reformulated to a threshold rule with a time-dependent threshold function, which simplifies the principal's design of the state-independent payment rule as well as the complexity of the agent's stopping decision.
The guarantee of incentive compatibility in the principal's problem for the rational agent's decision making is an important research agenda in mechanism design. As captured by the notion of implementability in mechanism design problems, the concept of equilibrium from game theory illustrates that the rational agent's truthful behaviors align with the principal's objectives. The design problem in this work faces the challenges from the dependence of current-period decisions on the anticipated future behaviors. Moreover, the stopping and the reporting decisions impact each other through influencing and being influenced by the expected payoff evaluated at each period. On one hand, by fixing a reporting strategy, the agent's stopping decision (based on the stopping rule) is made by comparing the payoff if he stops immediately and the best expected payoff he can anticipate from the future. The stopping decision determines the effective time horizon of the expected payoff at each period. On the other hand, with a fixed stopping decision, the reporting strategy is chosen by comparing the expected payoffs of different reporting strategies, which determines the expected instantaneous payoff at each period up to the effective time horizon pinned down by the stopping decision. Hence, the stopping rule enters the characterization of incentive compatibility through this dynamic interdependence. Given the mechanism, the stopping and the reporting decisions together determine the agent's optimal behav-iors. The coupling of these two decisions in the analysis of incentive compatibility distinguishes this work from other dynamic mechanism design problems.
We define the incentive compatibility in terms of Bellman equations and address the challege induced by the above dynamic multi-dimensional decision making by establishing a one-shot deviation principal (e.g., Blackwell [1965] ). One-shot deviation principal has uncovered a foundation of optimality in game theory that if the agent's deviation from truthful reporting is not profitable for one period, then any finite arbitrary deviations from truthfulness is not profitable. Monotonicity regarding the designer's allocation rules with respect to the agent's private information is an important result for the implementability of mechanism design. Consider a single-good auction in which the states are bidders' valuations for a single good and the outcomes are the probabilities for the agent to win the good. Here, the monotonicity refers to that the probability to win the good is non-decreasing in the reported state (see, e.g., Berger et al. [2010] , Myerson [1981] ). Myerson [1981] has shown that monotonicity is sufficient for implementability in a single dimensional domain. However, in general monotonicity acts only as a necessary condition. Rochet [1987] has constructed a necessary and sufficient condition, called cyclic monotonicity, under which one can design a mechanism such that truthful reporting is optimal for the rational agent. In this work, we describe a set of monotonicity conditions through inequalities characterized by functions of the non-monetary allocation rules, which we call potential functions. Given the optimality of the stopping rule, a sufficient condition of incentive compatibility is obtained by constructing the state-dependent payment rules in terms of potential functions. By applying the envelope theorem, we show a necessary condition of incentive compatibility and formulate the potential functions in closed form in terms of the allocation rule. The sufficient and the necessary conditions yield a revenue equivalence property for the dynamic environment. We also show that given the threshold function and the allocation rule, the state-independent payment rule is unique up to a constant. Based on the threshold rule, we provide a design principle for the state-independent payment rule by specifying a regular condition constructed by the allocation rule and the threshold function. We observe that the posted-price payments from the state-independent payment rule is restricted by a class of regular condition.
Related Work
General settings regarding the source of dynamic in the related literature can be divided into two categories. On one hand, the literature on dynamic mechanism design considers the dynamic population of participants with static private information. Parkes and Singh [2004] have provided an elegant extension of the social-welfaremaximizing (efficiency) VCG mechanism to an online mechanism design framework that studies sequential allocation problems in a dynamic-population environment. In particular, they have considered the setting when each self-interested agent arrives and departs dynamically over time. The private information in their model includes the arrival and the departure time as well as the agent's valuation about different outcomes. However, the agents do not learn new private information or update their private information. Pai and Vohra [2008] have proposed a dynamic mechanism model of the similar setting but focusing on the profit-maximization (optimality) of the designer. Other works focusing on this setting include, e.g., Board and Skrzypacz [2016] , Gallien [2006] , Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009] , Pai and Vohra [2013] , Said [2012] , Vulcano et al. [2002] . On the other hand, there is a number of works studying the problems of the static population where the underlying framework is dynamic because of the time-evolution of the private information. This category of research has been pioneered by the work of Baron and Besanko [1984] on regulation of a monopoly and the contributions of Courty and Hao [2000] on a sequential screening problem. There is a large amount of work in this category including, for instance, the dynamic pivot mechanisms (e.g., Bergemann and Välimäki [2010] , Kakade et al. [2013] ) and dynamic team mechanisms (e.g., Athey and Segal [2013] , Bapna and Weber [2005] , ). Pavan et al. [2014] have provided a general dynamic mechanism model in which the dynamic of the agents' private information is captured by a set of kernels that is applicable for different behaviors of the time evolution including the learning-based and i.i.d. evolution. They have used a Myersonian approach and designed a profit-maximizing mechanism with monotonic allocation rules. Kakade et al. [2013] have studied a dynamic virtual-pivot mechanism and provided conditions on the dynamics of the agents' private information. They have shown an optimal mechanism under the environment they call separable. Bergemann and Välimäki [2010] and Parkes [2007] have provided surveys of recent advances in dynamic mechanism design.
The challenges of both settings of dynamics described above come from the information asymmetry between the designer and the agents. Most of the mechanism design problems study the direct revelation mechanism, in which guaranteeing the incentive compatibility becomes essentially important. In many dynamic-population mechanism problems with static private information, the incentive compatibility constraints are essentially static (Kakade et al. [2013] ). The mechanisms with dynamic private information, however, requires efforts to guarantee the incentive compatibility. Monotonicity is an important property of incentive compatible mechanism design that is usually used in literature of dynamic mechanism design (see, e.g., Eső and Szentes [2007] , Kakade et al. [2013] , Pavan et al. [2014] ).
Many situations in economics can be modeled as stopping problems. There is literature on the mechanism design with stopping time. Kruse and Strack [2015] have studied an optimal stopping problem for dynamic allocation, where the agent is free to stop. They have considered that the agent privately observes a stochastic process, which influences the payoffs of the agent as well as the principal for the entire time horizon (i.e., before, at, and after the realized stopping time). Their model does not rely on the direct mechanism and no incentive compatibility constraints are considered. Instead, they have focused on a posted-price mechanism (see, e.g., Hartline [2001] ) that has only a single monetary transfer that specifies the payment when the agent stops. Pavan et al. [2009] have described an application of their dynamic mechanism approach to the optimal stopping problem, where the allocation rule provided by the principal is the stopping rule. Basic formats of stopping rules have been summarized in Lovász and Winkler [1995] and for rigorous mathematical formulations of general stopping problems, see Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] .
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the dynamic environment and specify the notations. Section 3 formulates the dynamic principalagent problem and clarifies the necessary assumptions for the model. In Section 4, we determine the optimal stopping rule for the agent and define the incentive compatibility constraints under the dynamic environment with the optimal stopping rule. We also establish the one-shot deviation principle for the dynamic mechanism. Section 5 characterizes the incentive compatibility of the dynamic mechanism by presenting the corresponding necessary and the sufficient conditions. We construct the payment rules in terms of the allocation rule and establish the revenue equivalence. In Section 6, we show an example of profit-maximizing mechanism and apply a relaxation approach to obtain the optimal decision rules for the principal. Section 7 concludes the work.
Dynamic Environment
There are two risk neutral participants in the mechanism: a principal (indexed by 0, she) and an agent (indexed by 1, he). We consider a finite time horizon with discrete
Based on θ t , the agent sends a reportθ t ∈ Θ t to the principal. Let σ t : Θ t → Θ t be the reporting strategy at t such thatθ t = σ t (θ t ) is the report sent to the principal. We say that the reporting strategy is truthful if σ t (θ t ) = θ t for all t ∈ T and θ t ∈ Θ t . Let Γ be the measurable set of the reporting strategy σ ≡ {σ t } t∈T . Upon receiving the reportθ t , the principal specifies an allocation a t ∈ A t and a payment p t ∈ R. Each A t is a measurable space of all possible allocations. The allocation and the payment are chosen, respectively, according to a set of rules α and φ , where α ≡ {α t } t∈T is a collection of (instantaneous) allocation rules α t : Θ t → A t and φ ≡ {φ t } t∈T is a collection of (instantaneous) payment rules φ t : Θ t → R, such that the principal chooses a t = α t (θ t ) and p t = φ t (θ t ) whenθ t is reported.
The mechanism allows the agent to quit the mechanism at any period t ∈ T by choosing a stopping time τ ∈ T according to his optimal stopping rule. We assume that the agent's preference for stopping rule is common knowledge. Hence, the principal's decision rules have to address any profitable deviations from truthful reporting due to the agent's stopping rule in the characterization of incentive compatibility. In order to influence the agent's decision of stopping time, the principal offers a terminal transfer ρ : T → R, with ρ(T ) = 0, which depends only on the realized stopping time τ chosen by the agent, such that the agent receives an additional monetary transfer ρ(τ). To distinguish the intermediate periods and the terminal period, let ξ t ≡ φ t when the agent realizes his stopping time at period t.
The mechanism is information-asymmetric because θ t is privately possessed by the agent for every t ∈ T and the principal can learn the true state only through the reportθ t . The mechanism is dynamic because the state θ t evolves over time and participants' decisions are made dynamically. The dynamics of the state evolution in-duces dynamics of probability measures over time. Therefore, the expectations of the future takes at different periods are in general different from each other. In the following subsection, we define the time-evolution of the state and describe the stochastic process that governs the dynamics of state generations.
Markovian Dynamics
We consider when the state evolves over time in a Markovian environment described in the following precise sense. As conventions, letx represent the random variable such that x is a realized sample ofx. By h x
as the density function, corresponding to the kernel K t (θ t−1 , a t−1 ) with F 1 is given at the initial period t = 1.
Given the current period state θ t , the expected next period state θ t+1 depends on θ t and the current allocation a t . Hence, the Markovian dynamics of the mechanism can be characterized by the allocation rule α and the transition kernel K. Ionescu-Tulcea theorem shows that given a set of kernels K ≡ {K t } t∈T , the allocation rule α ≡ {α t } t∈T uniquely defines a stochastic process Ξ α over Θ ≡ {Θ t } t∈T that governs the time evolution of the state from t = 1 to T , following which we define the interim process.
Definition 2 (Interim Process) The interim process Ξ α h θ t at period t ∈ T consists of (i) a deterministic process of the realized h θ t ∈ H θ t up to time t, and (ii) a stochastic process starting from t + 1 that is uniquely characterized by θ t , a t , the allocation rule α T t+1 ≡ {α s } T s=t+1 , and the kernels K T t ≡ {K s } T s=t+1 . Let σ ∈ Γ be any reporting strategy of the agent. Here, each σ t enters the time evolution of the states through the allocation rule a t = α t (σ t (θ t )), for all t ∈ T. Define Ξ α;σ and Ξ α;σ [h θ t ], respectively, the stochastic process and the interim process when the agent adopts reporting strategy σ , with Ξ α;σ ≡ Ξ α and Ξ α;
when the agent reports (and plans to report) truthfully for all t ∈ T. The timing of the mechanism is described as follows.
I. Ex-ante stage: before the agent participates. At this stage, the randomness of the future is characterized by Ξ α,σ . II. Interim stage: after state θ t is generated at period t ∈ T according to the Markov dynamics in Definition 1. At each interim stage: 1. The agent observes θ t , chooses a reportθ t = σ t (θ t ), and decides whether to stop immediately or continue to the next period. 2. Upon receivingθ t , the principal chooses an allocation a t = α t (θ t ), a payment p t = φ t (θ t ), and a terminal transfer ρ(t) if the agent stops at t.
At each interim stage, the randomness of the future is characterized by Ξ α,σ h θ t . III. Ex post stage: after the mechanism terminated, i.e., state is observed and reported, the stopping time is realized or period T is reached, and allocation and payments are delivered. There is no randomness of the future at this stage.
Dynamic Principal-Agent Problem
In this section, we first describe the principal-agent problem by identifying their respective objectives.
is the utility that the participant i receives when the true state is θ t and the allocation is a t for all t ∈ T. Given any time horizon τ ∈ T and reporting strategies σ ≡ {σ t } τ t=0 , define the ex-ante expected values of the principal and the agent, respectively, for any time horizon τ ∈ T,
(1) Agent:
Fix any time horizon τ ∈ T, we define the interim expected value function of the agent evaluated at period t when θ t is observed,θ t is reported at t, as
Then, we can define the corresponding interim expected payoff of the agent at period t as, for any reporting strategy σ , any time horizon τ ∈ T,
At the ex-ante stage, the principal provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent by taking into account the agent's stopping rule. Based on the offer and his own stopping rule, the agent decides whether to accept the offer or not. The principal's mechanism design problem is to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff (1) (i.e., profit maximizing or optimal mechanism), given the agent's stopping rule, by choosing the decision rules {α, φ , ξ , ρ} such that the mechanism satisfies the incentive compatibility and rational participation constraints, which will be elaborated in later sections. Upon receiving the offer, the agent, on the other hand, decides how to report his state at each period in order to maximize his interim expected payoff (4) and decides whether to realize the stopping time according to his stopping rule. At each period t, the agent's incentive of reporting truthfully depends on the current instantaneous payoff as well as the expected future payoffs. Since the agent knows the time evolution of the mechanism, he can determine his current reporting strategy and plan his future behaviors. Suppose at period t, θ t is realized. The current reportθ t = σ t (θ t ) changes the period-t allocation a t = α t (θ t ). Since a t enters the kernel K t+1 (θ t , a t ), the report θ t also changes the distribution of all future states. Similarly, at period t, the agent can plan each future reporting strategy σ t ′ , t ′ ∈ T t , by taking into account the influence of σ t ′ on the distribution of the states from period t ′ + 1 onward. As a result, the analysis of the principal's decision rules from each period needs to be coupled with all the agent's reporting strategies from period-t onward and the corresponding complexity has to be well addressed for the incentive compatibility constraints.
Analysis of optimal dynamic mechanism design requires the expectations evaluated at each period t ∈ T to be well-behaved as the agent's private state evolves dynamically over time. We impose the following standing assumptions by fixing the decision rules {α, φ , ξ , ρ}. All the following standing assumptions hold throughout the paper. Note that all the norms denoted by · are Euclidean norm.
Assumption 3. The instantaneous utility u 1,t is differentiable of θ t and is Lipschitz continuous on all finite θ t ∈ Θ t , for all t ∈ T.
Assumption 4. The difference given by
is non-decreasing in θ t for all t ∈ T.
Assumption 5. For all θ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T,
Assumption 1 states that the state realized at each period is fully supported. Assumption 2 states that the process of the state behaves in a way characterized by first-order stochastic dominance. Assumption 3 is important for the formulation of the first-order necessary condition based on envelope theorem. Assumption 4 allows us to establish the monotonicity of the stopping rule, where χ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t (θ t ) is the difference between the interim expected values of period t and t + 1 evaluated at period t. The boundedness in Assumption 5 is important in the existance of optimal stopping time and the formulation of incentive compatibility.
Optimal Stopping Rule
In this section, we construct the optimal stopping rule for the agent and identify the dynamic incentive compatibility constraints. We restrict our attention on the direct mechanism (Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] ), in which the agent reports truthfully, i.e., σ t (θ t ) = θ t for all t ∈ T. The importance of direct mechanism is due to the revelation principle, which states that if the decision rules {α, φ , ξ , ρ} that can be implemented by an indirect mechanism can be also implemented by a direct revelation mechanism (see, e.g., Jackson [2009] , Myerson [1981] ).
Fix a truthful reporting strategy σ * . The optimality of a stopping rule is defined as follows.
Definition 3 Given {α, φ , ξ , ρ}, the agent's stopping rule is said to be optimal if there exists a τ * such that
We say that the stopping rule is implementable by the decision rules {α, φ , ξ , ρ} if τ * solves (8).
To solve the optimal stopping problem (8), we define the agent's value function at period t as, for all θ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T,
where the supremum is taken over all time horizon τ of the process Ξ α [h θ t ] starting from t. Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Applying backward induction leads to the following Bellman equation representation of the value function.
Define the stopping region, for all t ∈ T,
Hence, we obtain the following stopping time corresponding to the Bellman equation (10) as,
Theorem 1.9 of Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] has shown that the stopping time τ t is optimal; i.e., τ t solves (9) 
the stopping rule characterized by (13) at each t also solves (8). Interested readers may refer to Chapter 1 of Peskir and Shiryaev [2006] for a rigorous characterization of general optimal stopping for Markovian processes.
With a slight abuse of notation, define the value function at period t given any
The incentive compatibility of the dynamic mechanism with optimal stopping rule is precisely defined in the following.
Definition 4 The dynamic mechanism {α, φ , ξ , ρ} with optimal stopping rule is incentive compatible (IC) if, for all reporting strategy σ , and
(2) for t = T ,
i.e., the agent of state θ t maximizes his value at period t by reporting truthfully at all t ∈ T. The allocation rule α is called implementable if there exists payment rules {φ , ξ , ρ} that makes the mechanism incentive compatible.
At the final period t = T , the agent stops with probability 1. His incentive to misreport the true state is captured by the immediate instantaneous payoff. The inequality (15) guarantees the non-profitability of misreporting and thus disincentivizes the agent from untruthful reporting. At each non-final period t, agent's exploration of profitable deviations from truthful reporting strategy takes into account the misreporting of the current state as well as any possible planned future misreporting. In particular, when the agent's optimal stopping rule calls for stopping if he reports
; when the agent's optimal stopping rule calls for continuing if he reports truthfully,
. Misreporting could result in three situations: (1) : misreporting at t and stopping at t,
(2) : misreporting at t, planned misreporting in the future, and continuing, (3) : truthful reporting at t, planned misreporting in the future, and continuing. Basically, the inequality (14) ensures that no such deviations from truthfully reporting is profitable.
Letσ be any reporting strategy that differs from truthful reporting strategy σ * in only one period t ∈ T. We call the adoption ofσ as one-shot deviation at t, for any period t ∈ T. For simplicity, let α|x t ,
when the true state is θ t and agent'sσ reportsθ t =σ t (θ t ) at t. We establish the one-shot deviation principle for our dynamic mechanism in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The mechanism {α, φ , ξ , ρ} with optimal stopping rule is IC if and only if there is no profitable one-shot deviation for any period t ∈ T, i.e.,
Proof. See Appendix A.
This one-shot principle enables us to reduce the complexity of the dynamic mechanism model and allows the analysis at each period t to focus only on the agent's incentive compatibility at the current period. Hence, the IC constraints (14) and (15) for any arbitrary deviations can be relaxed to one-shot deviation at each period t ∈ T, i.e., (16) and (17). In the rest of the paper, we focus on the one-shot deviation strategyσ that reportsθ t =σ t (θ t ) at any period t ∈ T and reports truthfully for all other periods.
Define the continuing value as
Then, the equality condition in the stopping region (12) is equivalent to µ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (θ t ) ≤ 0. Define the marginal value as, for all t ∈ T\{T },
captures the expected change in the interim expected payoffs evaluated at t if the agent stops at period t + 1 instead of stopping at t when θ t is observed. We have the following two lemmas regarding L Lemma 2 Given any time horizon τ ∈ T, we have
and
Proof. See Appendix B.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 4 holds. Then, L
The proof of Lemma 3 directly follows the formulation of J α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1 in Lemma 2. Lemma 2 shows that the agent's ex-ante expected payoff and period-t interim expected payoff can be represented in terms of L α,φ ,ξ ,ρ , ρ, and the corresponding expected payoffs if the agent stops at the starting periods (i.e., period 0 or period t). Lemma 3 establishes the single crossing condition that is necessary for the existence of the threshold-based stopping rule that will be introduced later.
Define, for all t ∈ T\{T },
We have the following lemma that directly follows Lemma 3.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 2 and 4 hold.μ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (θ t ) is non-decreasing of θ t , for all t ∈ T\{T }.
By following Lemma 2, we can represent the continuing value as µ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (θ t ) = µ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (θ t ) − ρ(t). Hence, we rewrite the stopping region Λ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t (12) as
Hence, the principal can adjust ρ(t) to influence the agent's stopping time by changing the stopping region Λ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t (t) in (23). Next, we introduce a class of threshold-based stopping rule (see, e.g., Jacka and Lynn [1992] , Kruse and Strack [2018] , Villeneuve [2007] ) that is optimal as characterized in (13). Let η : T → Θ t be the threshold function, for all t ∈ T such that the agent chooses to stop the first time the state θ t ≥ η(t). Since the agent has to stop at the final period, we require η(T ) =θ T . The threshold rule is defined as follows.
Definition 5 We say a stopping rule τ is a threshold rule if there exists an associated threshold function η such that
Lemma 5 shows the uniqueness of the threshold function.
Lemma 5 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, each threshold rule has a unique threshold function η(t).
Proof. See Appendix C.
The following lemma shows that the threshold rule is implementable.
Lemma 6 If the stopping rule is implementable by {α, φ , ξ , ρ}, then it is a threshold rule.
Proof. See Appendix D.
From (24), the state-independent ρ can be fully characterized by the threshold function η such that the principal can influence the agent's stopping time by manipulating η. For example, setting η(t) = θ t (resp. η t =θ t ) forces the agent to continue (resp. stop) with probability 1.
Incentive Compatibility
In this subsection, we reformulate the incentive compatibility constraints (16) and (17) in terms of the decision rules. Define the auxiliary functions
(θ t |h θ t−1 ), for j = S,S. The subscripts S andS, respectively, represent "stop" and "non-stop".
Lemma 7 The IC constraints (16) and (17) are equivalent to the following
for all θ t ,θ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T.
The conditions (27) and (28) reformulate the incentive constraints in (16) and (17). They ensure that misreporting is not profitable in the instantaneous payoff when the agent stops and continues, respectively. If (27) (resp. (28)) is satisfied, the optimality of the stopping rule guarantees that continuing (resp. stopping) is not profitable when the stopping rule calls for stopping (resp. continuing).
Characterization of Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we characterize the incentive compatibility of the dynamic mechanism. We first introduce the length functions and potential functions and show a sufficient condition by constructing the payment rules in terms of the potential functions based on the relationship between the length and the potential functions. Second, we determine the necessary condition for incentive compatibility by applying the envelope theorem and pin down the payment rules in terms of the allocation rule.
Define the length function as, for any θ t ,θ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T,
and, for any τ ∈ T t ,
such that ℓ S,t (θ t , θ t ) and ℓS ,t (θ t , θ t ), respectively, represent the length from θ t toθ t , while the agent keeps reportingθ t for both states when the agent stops at t and continues to the anticipated period τ. Let β α S,t (·) : Θ t → R and β ᾱ S,t (·) : Θ t → R be the potential functions that depend on only α. Proposition 1 shows the constructions of the payment rules φ and ξ in terms of the potential functions and the relationships between the length function and the potential functions that show the sufficiency for the incentive compatibility. The explicit formulations of the potential functions are obtained by determining a necessary condition shown later in Proposition 3.
Proposition 1 Fix an allocation rule α. Construct the payment rules φ and ξ as, for all t ∈ T,
The dynamic mechanism is incentive compatible if β ᾱ S,t and β α S,t satisfy for all θ t ,
Proof. See Appendix F. Since the payment rule ρ is independent of the state, the incentive compatibility constraints do not impose restrictions on ρ. The responsibility of ρ is to guarantee the optimality of the stopping rule. Specifically, by setting ρ(t) =μ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (η(t)), the corresponding stopping rule is optimal with η as the threshold function. By substituting φ t and ξ t constructed as (31) and (32), respectively, inμ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t , we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix an allocation rule α. The threshold rule with η is implementable by {α, φ , ξ , ρ}, where φ t and ξ t are constructed in (31) and (32) , respectively, and ρ satisfies the following regular condition:
For each threshold function η, we can apply backward induction to pin down ρ(t) in terms of β α S,t and β ᾱ S,t for each t from (36) given ρ(T ) = 0. Define with a slight abuse of notation
(37) The following lemma takes advantage of the quasilinearity of the payoff function and formulates the partial derivative of U α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (τ, θ t |h θ t−1 ) with respect to θ t by applying the envelope theorem.
where
Proposition 3 shows a necessary condition for the incentive compatibility of the dynamic mechanism, which is derived from the result in Lemma 8.
Proposition 3 Let α[θ t ] be the allocation rule one-shot deviation from α that reportŝ θ t = α t (θ ′ t ) for all θ ′ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T, and reports truthfully for all other periods. In any mechanism {α, φ , ξ , ρ} that implements the optimal stopping rule, βS ,t and β S,t that construct {φ , ξ , ρ} satisfy, for any arbitrary fixed states θ ε,t ∈ Θ , any θ ′ t ∈ Θ t , t ∈ T,
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 3 uses the result of Lemma 8 and provides the necessary conditions of the incentive compatibility by constructing the potential functions in (39) and (40) that depend only on the allocation rule α, up to a constant shift (determined by θ ε,t ). Hence, given α, the payment rules φ , ξ , and ρ are pinned down up to a constant. Such formulations lead to the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem, which is an important result in mechanism design problem in static settings (e.g., Myerson [1981] , Vickrey [1961] ) as well as in dynamic environments (e.g., Kruse and Strack [2018] , Pavan et al. [2014] ). We summarize the revenue equivalence feature of the dynamic mechanism with optimal stopping rule in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Fix an allocation rule α. Let β α;a
x,t and β α;b
x,t be potential functions constructed in Proposition 3, for x = {S, S}, all t ∈ T, given any two arbitrary states θ a ε,t , θ b ε,t ∈ Θ . Let φ a ≡ {φ a t } and φ b ≡ {φ b t } be two payment rules constructed by β α;ā S,t and β α;b S,t , respectively, in Proposition 1. Define ξ a and ξ b , and ρ a and ρ b in the similar way, for some threshold functions η a and η b . Then, there exist constants {C τ } τ∈T such that, for any t ∈ [0, τ], τ ∈ T,
Proof. See Appendix G.
The revenue equivalence in Proposition 4 implies that different mechanisms characterized by different allocation rules α result in equivalent expected costs of the principal up to a constant for each time horizon τ ∈ T. The following proposition shows the uniqueness of the state-independent payment rule ρ for each threshold function η.
Proposition 5 Fix an allocation rule α. Let β α;a
x,t and β α;b x,t be potential functions constructed in Proposition 3, for x = {S, S}, all t ∈ T, given any two arbitrary states θ a ε,t , θ b ε,t ∈ Θ . Let η be any threshold function such that η(t) ∈ Θ t , for each t ∈ T. Let ρ a and ρ b be two state-independent payment rules constructed by the same η in Proposition 2 through β α;a
x,t , respectively, for x = {S, S}. Then, there exist constants {C ρ t } t∈T such that, for any t ∈ T,
Fix an allocation rule α. From the formulations of potential functions in Proposition 3, the payment rule ρ given in (36) can be designed by the choice of η such that at each period t ∈ T, every η(t) ∈ Θ t has a corresponding ρ(t) that implements the optimal stopping rule (13). However, the principal is not omnipotent in the sense that in general she cannot freely post any value for ρ(t) from R, for all t ∈ T. Let r ≡ {r 1 , . . . , r T } ∈ R T be any sequence of real values. Define
Hence,R is the set of posted-price payment sequence ρ can choose from such that there exists a threshold function η for each payment sequence.
Corollary 1 Fix an allocation rule α that satisfies the conditions in Proposition 1 and 3, respectively. Suppose Assumption 4 holds and let η be a threshold function. Suppose ρ gives a sequence of posted-price payments r = {r t , . . . , r T }, where r t = ρ(t), t ∈ T. Then, the following statements hold.
(i) ρ with α implements the optimal stopping rule (13) if and only if r ∈R.
(ii) Let r ∈R. Let r ′ differ from r in arbitrary periods, such that for some t, r ′ t = r t +ε t , for some non-zero ε t ∈ R. Suppose r ′ ∈R due to these r ′ t 's. Then, posting r ′ may fail the incentive compatibility constraints. (iii) Let φ and ξ be constructed in Proposition 1. If the mechanism does not involve ρ, then {α, φ , ξ } is incentive compatible if and only if there exists θ t ∈ Θ t such that, for all t ∈ T,
where β ᾱ S,t and β α S,t (θ t ) are given in Proposition 3.
Optimal Mechanism and Relaxation
The principal's mechanism design problem is to maximize her ex-ante expected payoff (1) by choosing the decision rules {α, φ , ξ , ρ}. The time horizon of the principal's ex-ante expected payoff is called the mean first passage time, denoted asτ. Given the agent's optimal stopping rule,τ is determined by {α, φ , ξ , ρ} and the choice of η. From Proposition 1 and 2, φ and ξ can be represented by α, and ρ can be determined by α and η. Define the mapping λ from the allocation rules and threshold function to the mean first passage time, i.e.,τ = λ (α, η; Ξ α ).
At the ex-ante stage, the principal provides a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent. The agent decides whether to participate at the ex-ante stage. Becides the incentive compatibility constraints shown in Lemma 7, the mechanism also requires a class of rational participation (RP) constraint as
i.e., the anticipated ex-ante expected payoff of the agent by using the optimal stopping rule is non-negative. Since the decision making at the ex-ante stage involves no private information, the principal'sτ coincides with the agent's. We relax the original mechanism problem by applying a class of relaxation approach (e.g., Deb et al. [2008] , Eső and Szentes [2007] , Kakade et al. [2013] , Pavan et al. [2014] ), in which the principal optimizes her objective function given the necessary conditions for the incentive compatibility described in Proposition 3. In particular, substituting the constructions of φ , ξ , and ρ in terms of the potential functions formulated in Proposition 3 and integrating by parts yield the principal's objective function in the relaxed problem as,
Since the problem here is finite-time horizon,τ exists. However, stopping rule problems generally do not have closed form solutions and approaches of approximation must be used. The general approach of the computation ofτ (interested reader may refer to Jaskowski and van Dijk [2016] ) and the corresponding involvements in the optimization process are not the scope of this paper.
Lemma 9 Suppose that the utility functions u i,t is non-decreasing in the state θ t , for all i = 0, 1, t ∈ T. Under Assumption 2, J α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t is a non-decreasing function of θ t for all t ∈ T.
Proof. See Appendix H.
To illustrate the theoretical results, we consider a simple seller-buyer problem, in which the seller is the principal and the buyer is the agent. The seller-buyer relationship lasts for at most T = 2 periods and the buyer can quit at any period. The allocation a t is the product the seller offers at period t and the payment p t is the payment. At the beginning of each period t, the realized state θ t represents the buyer's preference over the product the seller is going to offer. Suppose that the initial state θ 1 is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with f 1 (θ 1 ) = 1 and F 1 (θ 1 ) = θ 1 . Let c 1 ∈ (0, 1) and let c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ∈ R ++ . Consider that the buyer's state evolves as follows:
where ω 2 is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Let the participants' utilities be given by
It is straightforward to see that Assumptions 1-4 are satisfied.
Here, u 1,t is non-decreasing in θ t . From Lemma 9, we have J (λ (α, η; Ξ α ), θ 1 ) = 0, then the RP constraint (46) is satisfied and the principal's objective function in (47) 
(48) Next, we describe the optimal mechanism for T = 2, with c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = 1 2 and c 4 = 1 with δ = 1. When the choice of η leads to λ (α, η; Ξ α ) = 2, the optimal allocation rule α * are given by α * 1 (θ 1 ) =
Fix θ ε,1 = θ ε,2 = 0. The payment rules are given as follow:
and ρ * (1) = α * 1 (η(1)) +
for any η(1) ∈ Θ 1 . when the choice of η leads to λ (α, η; Ξ α ) = 1, the optimal allocation rule is given by α * 1 (θ t ) = 2θ 1 . and α * 2 can be any (non-negative) allocation rule such that the potential functions constructed in Proposition 3 satisfy the inequalities in Proposition 1. The corresponding optimal payment rules are constructed as
and ξ * 2 (θ t ) is constructed in Proposition 1 in terms of α * 1 and α * 2 , and ρ * is given in (52).
Conclusion
This work focuses on the characterizations of the incentive compatibility of a finitehorizon dynamic mechanism design problem, in which the agent has the right to stop the mechanism at any period. We have solved an optimal stopping time problem under this dynamic environment for the agent to optimally select the time of stopping. A state-independent payment rule has been introduced that delivers a payment only at the realized stopping time. This payment rule enables the principal to directly influence the realization of the agent's stopping time. We have also shown that under certain conditions, the optimal stopping problem can be fully represented by a threshold rule. Incentive compatibility has been defined in terms of Bellman equations. A one-shot deviation principle has been established to address the complexity from the dynamic nature of the environment and the coupling of agent's reporting choices and stopping decisions. By relying on a set of formulations characterized by the non-monetary allocation rule, the formulations we call potential functions, we have constructed the payment rules to obtain the sufficiency argument of the incentive compatibility for the dynamic environment. The quasilinear payoff formulation enables us to derive a necessary condition for incentive compatibility from the envelope theorem, which determines the explicit formulation of the potential functions. These settings naturally lead to the revenue equivalence.
Our analysis provides design regimes for optimal direct mechanism in general quasilinear dynamic environments when the incentive compatibility takes into account not only the agent's reporting behaviors but also his stopping decisions. From the necessary and the sufficient conditions, we can design the state-independent terminal payment rule by the allocation rule and the threshold function. As a result, the expected first-passage time (i.e., the expected time-horizon of the principal's ex-ante expected payoff) seen at the ex-ante stage is fully determined by the allocation rule and the threshold function given the transition kernels of the state. We have described the principal's optimal mechanism design by applying a class of relaxation approach that reformulates the principal's objective function by making the mechanism satisfy the necessary condition. Hence, the principal's optimization problem can be handled by finding the optimal allocation rule and the optimal threshold function. A regular condition is described to provide a design principle for the state-independent payment rule. Due to the analytical intractability, however, we have chosen instead to focus on the case when the threshold function is given with the corresponding expected firstpassage time of the ex-ante stage. A numerical example of a seller-buyer problem has been shown to illustrate the optimal mechanism design. The extension to multiple-agent environments should be our natural next step. In environments with multiple agents, allowing early exit of each agent leads to dynamic population over time, which is state-dependent. The relationships between population and individual payoffs could complicate the analysis of incentive compatibility. Other nontrivial extensions could introduce arrivals of new agents whose incentive to participation is characterized by both rational participation constraints provided by the principal as well as the history of the mechanism.
Here, (56) implies that any deviation(s) for the periods from t to t + k (reporting truthfully for all other periods) is enough to improve the value V α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t . Letσ s be the reporting strategy that differs only at period s from σ * andσ s s = σ ′′ s , for s ∈ [t,t + k]. Then, we have
Now, we look at period t + k − 1. Because, σ * satisfies (16) and (17), we have, for all θ t+k−1 ∈ Θ t+k−1 ,
Then, E
From (57) and (59), we have
Backward induction yields
which contradicts the fact that σ * satisfies (16) and (17).
Following the similar analysis we can prove the case when the optimal stopping rule with truthful σ * (1) calls for stopping and the agent decides to stop; (2) calls for continuing and the agent decides to continue; (3) calls for continuing and the agent decides to stop.
B Proof of Lemma 2
Here we prove (20) . The establishment of (21) can be proven in the similar way. For any τ ∈ T, the agent's ex-ante expected payoff (2) can be written as
From law of total expectation, we have
C Proof of Lemma 5
Let τ η denote the optimal stopping time given the threshold function η. Suppose there are two thresholds η and η ′ , with η = η ′ . such that τ η = τ η ′ . Without loss of generality, suppose η(t) < η ′ (t) for some t ∈ T. Here, we obtain
We obtain P r (τ η ′ = t) in a similar way. Then,
Since τ η = τ η ′ , the probabilities P r (τ η ′ = t) and P r (τ η = t) are equal, i.e., (60) equals 0. However, Assumption 1 yields E α|θ t−1 1 {η(t)≤θt ≤η ′ (t)} > 0 and P r (τ η > t − 1) > 0, which implies that
This contradiction implies that η is unique.
D Proof of Lemma 6
Thus, the agent stops at t optimally. Since {α,φ ,ξ ,ρ} implementsτ, we obtain, for everyθ t ≤ θ t ,
where the inequality is due to Lemma 4. Therefore,
E Proof of Lemma 8
The formulation (38) is obtained by applying envelope theorem and backward induction. Let π t : Θ t−1 × A t−1 → ∆ (A t ) such that π t (a t |θ t−1 ,a t−1 ) is the probability distribution of a t = α t (θ t ) conditioning on θ t−1 and a t−1 . Clearly, both F t (θ t |θ t−1 ,a t−1 ) and π t (a t |θ t−1 ,a t−1 ) are two functions of θ s for all s ≤ t, s ∈ T. Let Θ t,τ ≡ ∪ τ s=t Θ s . Fix τ ∈ T. For τ > t, from the definition of expectation, we have U α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (τ,θ t |h θ t−1 ) =δ t u 1,t (θ t ,a t ) + φ t (θ t ) + ρ(t) By applying the envelope theorem and integrating by parts, we obtain the following due to the product rule, ∂U α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t Applying backward induction yields (38).
F Proof of Proposition 1 and 3
Propositions 1 and 3 together form the necessary and sufficient conditions for incentive compatibility. We show the proofs together here. Fix an arbitraryθ ε,t ∈ Θ ε . We discuss the following two cases:
1. θ t ∈ Λ t (t) :
-Necessity (⇒)
Letθ t ∈ Λ t (t). Without loss of generality, assumeθ t ≤ θ t . Let θ , θ 1 , θ 2 ∈Θ t ≡ [θ t ,θ t ].
Since α is IC implementable, there exists ξ such that δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) + ξ t (θ t ) + ρ(t) ≥ δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) + ξ t (θ t ) + ρ(t).
IC implementability implies that θ ∈ arg max x∈θt δ t u 1,t (θ ,α t (x)) + ξ t (x) .
Then, we obtain
By Assumption 5, we have that B t is Lipschitz continuous. Thus, B t is differentiable almost everywhere. Therefore, we have
Applying envelope theorem to B t yields dB t (y) dy y=θ = ∂ ∂ x δ t u 1,t (x,α t (θ )) + ξ t (θ ) x=θ = ∂ ∂ x δ t u 1,t (x,α t (θ )) x=θ =γ α t (t,θ |h θ t−1 ).
Therefore, we have β α S,t (θ t ) − β α S,t (θ t ) =B t (θ t ) − B t (θ t ) =δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) + ξ t (θ t ) − δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) + ξ t (θ t )
From the definition of ℓ S,t (θ t ,θ t ), we have ℓ S,t (θ t ,θ t ) =δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) − δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) =δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) − δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) + δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) − δ t u 1,t (θ t ,α t (θ t )) Substituting the formulations of φ and ξ given in (31) and (32), respectively, and using the fact β ᾱ S,t 
-Sufficiency (⇐)
From the constructions of φ and ξ given in (31) and (32), respectively, we have (for simplicity, we use u 1,s to denote u 1,s (θ s ,α s (θ s ))) µ α,φ ,ξ ,ρ t (θ t ,θ t ) + δ t u 1,t (θ t ,θ t ) + ξ t (θ t ) 
H Proof of Lemma 9
It is easy to obtain that
∂ r r=θs G t,s (hθ t,s ) .
From Assumption 2, we have G t,s (hθ t,s ) ≥ 0. Since u 1,t is a non-decreasing function of θ t , ∂ J α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t (τ,r|h θ t−1 ) ∂ r r=θt ≥ 0. Therefore, J α,φ ,ξ ,ρ 1,t (τ,r|h θ t−1 ) is a non-decreasing function of θ t , for all t ∈ T.
